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This empirical study of business-to-business service firms examines the determinants and effects 
of control rights to intellectual assets in a property rights theoretic framework. Regression 
analyses using survey data suggest that service suppliers who retain control over their 
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thus be better off balancing their need to control outsourced activities with the suppliers’ 
incentives to invest in learning and innovation. Additionally, and aligned with property rights 
theoretic predictions, service suppliers’ bargaining power and their indispensability in service 
projects are positively associated with their ability to retain control rights. In contrast, innovation 
capabilities are not very significant in determining control rights allocation between service 
suppliers and their clients. 
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1 Introduction 
The growing literature on the knowledge-based view of the firm has argued that practices for 
managing knowledge assets can have substantial effects on firm performance (e.g., Wernerfelt, 
1984; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997). This paper focuses on the 
governance of knowledge assets in client-supplier relationships. Governance matters for 
performance, because, in contrast to physical assets, property rights to valuable knowledge assets 
may be difficult to establish and enforce in knowledge-based interaction with partners. In other 
words, involuntary transfers of knowledge—spillovers—are difficult to avoid in close supply 
relationships. Indeed, governance arrangements are often put in place in these kinds of 
relationships to minimize spillovers (Oxley, 1997). The novelty of this paper is to empirically 
examine the incentive effects associated with such attempts to control intellectual assets and 
their use in supply relationships. 
In the economics of innovation, the ability to control knowledge is seen to create 
incentives to invest in research and development (R&D) (Levin et al., 1987). Then, the allocation 
of rights to control intellectual assets created in supply relationships can have strategic 
ramifications. The party who obtains the rights to a newly created knowledge asset will be 
motivated to improve it, build on it, and use it in a variety of applications. Innovation activities 
are thus implicated by the allocation of control rights to intellectual assets in firms’ external 
relationships. Viewing the appropriability problem in supply relationships as an instance of 
incomplete contracting (cf. Elfenbein & Lerner, 2003), this paper argues that the arrangements to 
control the intellectual assets created or used in a supply relationship between two firms affect 
the partners’ incentives to build on that knowledge. Empirical analysis to follow suggests that 
these arrangements are a significant driver of innovation in knowledge-based business services, 
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but it is argued that the results obtained here are applicable in a broader range of industries and 
collaborative innovation settings. Control rights allocation in supply relationships is thus an 
important context of intellectual property rights strategy. 
In rapidly changing business environments, success often depends on collaboration 
between firms. This study focuses on the interaction between knowledge-intensive business 
service (KIBS) providers and their client firms. Business service firms are knowledge intensive 
when their service operations rely on professional knowledge and either generate new 
knowledge themselves (e.g., engineering and R&D services) or act as knowledge intermediaries 
for their clients (e.g., computer and communication services) (Miles & Boden, 2000; Löwendahl, 
1997). Miles et al. (1995), for example, include services such as software and other computer-
related services, management consulting, technical engineering, design, and R&D consulting in 
this category. Actual measures of knowledge intensity of firms in the sample used here indicate 
that, on average, 33% of employees in these firms have higher education degrees (college or 
higher) and that firms’ service development investments average about 3% of sales revenue. 
These numbers are much higher than those found in the manufacturing sector (means for the 
whole manufacturing sector in a representative sample are 11% and 1.2%, respectively; see SF, 
2000). 
Business services have recently attracted a lot of attention due to their rapid growth in the 
OECD countries. For example, according to Tomlinson’s (2000) macroeconomic input-output 
analysis, the share of KIBS inputs in the UK economy has increased from 5% in 1970 to 25% in 
1990. This growth may be caused by a growing demand for knowledge-intensive services and by 
changes in the division of labor among industries. Availability of outsourcing arrangements have 
provided manufacturing firms with the option to shift many service activities to external 
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providers (O'Farrell, 1995). Consequently, specialized business service suppliers have become a 
significant source of knowledge and innovation for manufacturing firms.  
Knowledge-intensive business services also represent a fascinating context for study 
because most of their transactions involve knowledge, varying from codified technological 
blueprints to difficult-to-communicate organizational knowledge (Hansen, Nohria, & Tierney, 
1999; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). As a result, the processes for managing and creating 
knowledge are central for competitive advantage in these industries. This study explores how 
business service firms create knowledge and structure knowledge transactions. Focusing on the 
effects of the allocation of formal control rights to intellectual assets, the goal of this paper is to 
generate insights applicable in the more general area of the management of knowledge-based 
supply relationships.  In some business service industries, particularly industrial design, the norm 
is to yield the control rights to the clients. This serves to protect clients’ strategically sensitive 
product development activities in which the service supplier participates. However, in many 
other industries, control rights may not be quite as critical for the client. For example, software 
or other information technology service supply relationships are a possible field of application of 
the results obtained here. 
The current study can be viewed as an empirical application of the economic incomplete 
contracting theory. Its contribution is that, in addition to assessing the determinants of the 
allocation of control rights in a new empirical setting, the effects on innovation outcomes are 
directly assessed. We empirically examine the argument originally made by Aghion and Tirole 
(1994) that control rights to intellectual assets are associated with incentives and ability to invest 
in the creation of new knowledge. Control-right allocation may therefore have dynamic effects 
on the performance of the supply relationship and the partners themselves. Control rights to 
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jointly created knowledge assets should socially optimally be allocated to the partner that is the 
best positioned to make noncontractible investments in the project and, later on, build on and 
improve the asset. However, bargaining power differences may lead to inefficient allocation of 
the rights if the powerful partner is not the more important one in making noncontractible 
investments. The next section builds on extant literature and derives empirical hypotheses 
concerning the determinants and effects of the allocation of control rights to knowledge assets 
between vertically related organizations. Section 3 describes the business service dataset, 
empirical analysis of which is carried out in section 4. Section 5 discusses the results and draws 
conclusions. 
2 Knowledge Creation and Client Relationships in Business Services: 
Literature Review and Empirical Hypotheses 
Firms engage in R&D alliances or outsourcing arrangements to gain access to proprietary 
information and competences (Hagedoorn, 1993; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989, 1991; Kale, 
Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000; Kogut, 1988). Indeed, much of the previous strategic management 
research on supply relationships (e.g., Asanuma, 1989; Dyer, 1996; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000) and 
strategic alliances (e.g., Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1996; Anand & Khanna, 2000) focuses 
on the accumulation and exchange of knowledge in network relationships, abstracting from the 
role of intellectual or other property rights. For example, Mowery et al. (1996) rely on patent 
data but use them to examine the role of firms’ technological capability portfolios in alliance 
formation.  
Another stream of research within the alliance literature highlights the appropriability 
problem inherent in strategic alliances, where intellectual property rights are likely to provide 
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incomplete protection for strategic assets. For example, Kale et al. (2000) discuss the importance 
of relational capital in protecting strategically important assets in alliances, and Teece (1986), 
Pisano (1989), and Oxley (1997; also Oxley and Sampson 2004) have suggested that by 
choosing carefully how to organize joint R&D, firms can attenuate appropriability hazards. 
Intellectual assets created in collaborative relationships may thus give rise to competitive 
advantage, but attention needs to be paid to their management and governance. Much of the 
above research concludes that more protection for intellectual assets generally is better, although 
the benefits of protection need to be balanced against the cost of governance. Similarly, 
economic studies of the sources and implications of appropriability (Levin et al., 1987; Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1989) highlight the idea that in the absence of protection for the returns on innovation 
activities, R&D investment levels will be suboptimal. These studies are thus concerned with the 
incentives created by the rights to control the results of innovation activities.  
In summary, existing economic and management literatures suggest that control of 
intellectual property is central for firms to invest in R&D and engage in alliances and networks, 
and, consequently, each actor should control their intellectual assets maximally. Empirical 
research has not explicitly examined the idea that firms could write contracts strategically to 
create incentives for their partners to exert effort in noncontractible activities. Namely, when 
each firm individually maximizes the control of intellectual property, innovation incentives are 
not necessarily optimally distributed in the economy. In some instances, both partners are better 
off when control rights are allocated to the party that is the best positioned to innovate. 
Extant research on networks and alliances typically emphasizes informal mechanisms of 
governance (e.g., Dyer & Singh, 1998). An exception is Sampson (2004) who argues that 
misaligned alliance governance may depress the incentives to innovate. However, the focus of 
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her study is to estimate the total costs of misaligned governance, not their incentive implications. 
Aligned with Sampson’s (2004) work, and with that of Poppo and Zenger (2002), this paper 
argues that even though informal mechanisms of governance are vital for the success of business 
relationships, formal mechanisms usefully codify rules and principles that govern the 
relationship. The theoretical lens to analyze alliance contracts has often been transaction cost 
economics, whereas this paper suggests that other models of incomplete contracting2 can be 
applied in the study of knowledge-based interfirm relationships. In particular, the property rights 
theory might be of value to scholars of alliance and supply relationships (see Foss & Foss, 2005).  
The theoretical framework developed here consists of three arguments from the property 
rights theory of the firm (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1990; see also Hart, 1995). 
First, allocation of control rights should optimally depend on the partners’ relative abilities to 
contribute to and utilize the jointly created knowledge asset. The party that is more effective at 
creating, using, or building valuable new knowledge on the asset should obtain the control rights 
to it. However, second, bargaining power differences may distort the control right allocation in 
practice (Aghion & Tirole, 1994). Third, the allocation of rights to intellectual assets in supplier 
relationships matters to the parties, because control rights have significant effects on the 
incentives to invest in noncontractible activities, such as innovation. We will elaborate each of 
the three arguments below. 
The first of the three main arguments concerns how control rights should optimally get 
allocated. Hart and Moore’s model (1990) shows that the party whose noncontractible 
investments are indispensable for the project should hold the property rights to the project assets 
                                                 
2 Transaction cost theory can be seen as one framework among the many informal and formal models that all 
examine the causes and effects of incomplete contracts. 
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in order to generate best possible (second-best) incentives for the parties to make noncontractible 
investments. An agent is indispensable when the underlying assets have no effect on the 
marginal productivity of the other parties’ investments without the indispensable partner—the 
agent’s human capital is critical for the project outcome. Indispensability can be assessed from 
the point of view of the service provider’s direct contributions to client projects. For example, 
Elfenbein and Lerner (2003) found in a study of Internet portal alliances that the allocation of 
ownership to key assets was influenced by the relative efforts of the alliance parties (see also 
Leiponen, 2006b). Aligned with earlier research, we hypothesize that service firms that are in a 
position to greatly influence the project outcome are more likely to retain control of intellectual 
assets:  
Hypothesis 1 Service firms that are relatively more indispensable in client projects are more 
likely to retain control rights to intellectual assets in client relationships than 
firms that provide less critical inputs. 
 
Furthermore, it is proposed here that, optimally, future interactions of the parties should be 
considered. In a long-term, ongoing, service relationship, it is not only the efficiency in the 
current project that matters; implications of current learning for future projects should also be 
taken into account in making decisions about the organization of joint projects. In other words, 
optimizing the organization of joint activities should take place in an intertemporal framework 
(e.g., Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002). While the data available do not allow explicitly testing 
dynamic models, we argue that in an empirical context where competitiveness is based on 
knowledge creation and repeated interactions are highly valued because of search and 
contracting costs, client firms should care about the incentives for future knowledge creation 
they provide for their suppliers. Therefore, they should consider letting potentially highly 
innovative service providers retain control rights. 
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In view of the dataset used here, we assume that firms with existing procedures and 
capabilities to innovate are well positioned to contribute to current and future creative projects 
(cf. Lerner & Merges, 1998, consider patent holdings of the R&D firm). Even though relatively 
few business service firms have institutionalized R&D units, many of the sampled service firms 
expend substantial human resources in the development of new or improved services. Service 
development often involves rotating or ad hoc project teams that put aside time for research (e.g., 
market research and other external information sourcing) and meetings to discuss and develop 
new service concepts. However, some organizations have a permanent team that is in charge of 
service development, and technical service firms (engineering or R&D services) may even have 
an R&D facility. We assume that service providers that invest highly in these kinds of service 
development activities are more likely to have accumulated innovation capabilities that enable 
them to make unique intellectual contributions in client relationships. As a consequence, they 
have a higher probability of retaining control rights:  
Hypothesis 2 Service firms with stronger capabilities to innovate are more likely to retain 
control rights to intellectual output than service firms with weak or no innovation 
capabilities. 
 
The second theoretical argument developed by Aghion and Tirole (1994) suggests that, in 
practice, ownership shares in collaborative arrangements may reflect bargaining power of the 
partners rather than the importance of their contributions. For example, the relative financial 
positions of the collaborating firms may influence ownership allocation outcomes and create 
inefficiencies. In particular, if the more powerful party is not the more indispensable one for the 
outcome of the project, property rights are likely to get misallocated. An empirical example from 
Lerner and Merges (1998) is a situation where a biotechnology company that is highly cash 
constrained and competes against other similar technology providers allies with a larger 
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pharmaceutical company. Even if the biotechnology company were much more important for the 
success of the project, Aghion and Tirole would predict that the pharmaceutical company obtains 
and holds on to the control rights to innovations arising from the alliance. This is individually 
rational for the company—it may obtain a higher payoff this way—but it doesn’t provide 
socially optimal incentives and thus will not maximize total welfare. In other words, it would be 
possible for both parties to receive a higher payoff if there were mechanisms to provide optimal 
incentives and distribute the marginal payoff to both parties. In reality, however, the expected 
returns from innovation will be reduced because the biotechnology firm has suboptimal 
investment incentives.  
This theory thus sheds light on the question of what prevents firms from optimally 
allocating control rights in a service relationship. According to Aghion and Tirole, the chief 
source of this type of inefficiency is differences in bargaining power. If the service provider’s 
client is large and prominent, it is highly likely to obtain intellectual control rights in the 
relationship, independent of the optimal configuration. As a result, the service provider may have 
suboptimal incentives to invest in learning and build on the knowledge jointly created. However, 
in principle, it is equally possible that the service firm retains control rights even if its client has 
higher innovation or contribution potential, provided that the service firm is more powerful. This 
might be the case if the service firm is larger or financially stronger than its clients. Then the 
clients’ incentives would be compromised. The empirical hypothesis is the following: 
Hypothesis 3 Bargaining power of business service firms is positively associated with their 
ability to retain control rights to intellectual assets in client relationships. 
 
In the empirical examination we cannot directly test whether inefficiency is indeed created by 
the allocation of control rights, but we will examine whether proxies for bargaining power 
explain control rights allocation. If our empirical measures for bargaining power statistically 
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significantly explain control rights outcomes, we have indirect evidence of inefficiency. Control 
rights to intellectual assets are then distributed based on bargaining power instead of the parties’ 
potential contributions. A possible reason for this outcome is that it is individually rational for 
the more powerful party to retain the rights. Then, it may be impossible to design mechanisms 
that provide socially optimal incentives and a pareto improving division of payoffs. However, it 
is also conceivable, considering the extant managerial intellectual property literature that 
emphasizes control, that firms prefer to err on the side of excessive control, because this reduces 
the uncertainty about the future value of the knowledge asset. When this is the case, firms would 
be better off if they adopted a more long-term view of the service relationship and included 
suppliers’ incentive considerations in their strategic calculations.  
The final, third, argument implies that control rights related to intellectual assets are 
associated with incentives and ability to invest in the creation of new knowledge. The property 
rights theory holds that when contracts are incomplete, the party who owns or controls an asset 
will be the “residual claimant”—they will collect the residual returns on their own 
noncontractible investments and will therefore be motivated to make these investments (Hart & 
Moore, 1990). Learning and innovation are typically to a significant degree noncontractible. As a 
result, control rights allocation influences the performance of the supply relationship and the 
partners themselves. Business service firms that do not retain control rights to their accumulated 
knowledge are constrained in terms of innovation opportunities. For example, new insights 
gained in management consulting projects cannot be built on and marketed to other firms if the 
first client requires exclusivity within its industry. Similarly, a new technology developed by an 
R&D service provider to solve the problem of one client cannot be utilized in another client’s 
project if the first client obtains all intellectual property rights. Under these circumstances, the 
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service provider has little incentive to put forth extra effort—beyond what is specified in the 
(incomplete) service contract—and they will be less innovative in their service relationships. 
However, it is important to recognize that it is not always optimal for the service provider 
to obtain the control rights. When the client is more relevant for the project or relationship 
outcome, i.e., they are in a position to better influence the outcome, they should obtain the rights 
to control key knowledge assets. Even in this case, however, control right allocation will 
influence the service provider’s innovation incentives. At the margin, thus, there exist firms that 
would have innovated if it wasn’t for the contractual arrangements they had entered that reduce 
their ability to benefit from the investments in innovation: 
Hypothesis 4 Service firms that retain control rights to intellectual assets are more likely to 
innovate than firms that yield control rights to their clients.  
 
Moreover, the effect of control right allocation on innovation incentives is expected to be 
stronger with respect to introduction of new services than with respect to improving existing 
services. New service introductions are riskier and costlier than service improvements from the 
service provider’s point of view, and, without the right to control the use of relevant intellectual 
assets, they may not be profitable for the firm. Being able to control and benefit from the 
outcome is thus even more important for new service development projects than it is for 
incremental service improvement projects. This leads to the fifth and last hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 5  Retaining control rights is more strongly associated with firms making new 
service introductions than with those making service improvements.  
 
It is also worth considering whether control rights and innovation outcomes matter for business 
service firms. The relevance of control rights depends on the assumption that innovation is 
indeed an important competitive goal for business service firms. Existing empirical evidence 
suggests this is the case: business service providers report higher levels of innovativeness than 
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firms in the manufacturing sector (45% of the sampled business service firms launched new 
services; 26% of manufacturing firms launched new products in a representative sample; see SF, 
1998). Summary discussion of 15 case studies by Miles et al. (1995) supports this view. 
Furthermore, in the current survey dataset, business service executives were asked to assess how 
important a set of factors were for the competitive advantage of their firm. Learning on the job 
and reputation were rated the most important factors, as argued in other studies (Löwendahl, 
1997; DeBandt, 1996; Holmström, 1985).  Service improvement and innovation were regarded 
about as important as formal education, training on the job, or marketing.3 Similarly, Löwendahl 
argues that innovation and creation of new services are important strategic goals for certain types 
of professional services (1997: 126). According to these studies, then, innovation is a relevant 
goal for many business service firms. If control rights to intellectual assets enable business 
service firms to innovate, firms will care about control rights. 
3 The Business Service Dataset 
This section describes the survey dataset and constructs estimation variables to be used in the 
empirical analysis. The data were collected through a mail survey of Finnish knowledge-
intensive business service firms, administered by the Research Institute of the Finnish Economy. 
A questionnaire, developed after semi-structured interviews with 16 chief executives from 
leading Finnish business service firms and respective industry associations,4 was mailed to 445 
                                                 
3 On a scale of 0–3 (not important–very important), 160 business service executives responded that the 
competitiveness of their firm depends on learning on the job (mean score 2.8), reputation (2.7), training (2.4), 
improvements to existing services (2.3), formal education (2.3), knowledge residing in teams (2.2), marketing (2.1) 
and innovation (2.0). Thus, in this survey, introduction of new services and improvement of existing services were 
most often considered to be important or very important determinants of competitive advantage. 
4 The interviews were carried out before designing the survey questionnaire and they were semistructured, lasting 1-
3 hours. Interviewees included CEOs or business development managers of the largest firms in each industry and a 
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firms. Questionnaire recipients were identified from the lists obtained from Statistics Finland of 
the 100 largest firms in the six industries studied. Focusing on the largest firms was necessary 
because of the small average size of firms in these industries and the emphasis on organizational 
aspects in this study. Questionnaires were addressed to CEOs, although, in about 10% of the 
cases, other managers such as those responsible for business or service development responded. 
Forty-six of the firms were found to be invalid: they did not participate in the targeted industries, 
had merged, or had gone out of business. Service subsidiaries of manufacturing corporations 
were also excluded.  
The advantages of using this source of data include unusually detailed information of 
both innovation activities and client relationships for a broad set of business service firms and 
industries. The downside is that the level of analysis is the firm. Ideally, property-rights theoretic 
predictions should be analyzed at the level of transactions or projects, but it is very difficult to 
obtain these kinds of data for a cross-section of firms. Instead, our survey instrument asked 
respondents to describe their contractual practices and other aspects of their relationships with 
key clients. According to supplementary interviews, in ongoing service relationships, contractual 
frames are typically not rewritten for each project. Instead, the first project contract is carefully 
negotiated while subsequent contracts only modify the project specifics and fill in any gaps 
observed. One of the very important initial negotiations concern control rights, in particular, how 
clients’ sensitive knowledge assets are protected. Contractual practices regarding control rights 
thus tend to be relatively stable over time and across projects with the same client.5 This 
                                                                                                                                                             
set of smaller companies based on suggestions by industry association contacts. More detailed information about 
these interviews can be obtained from the author.  
5 However, because the survey instrument contained no direct questions about this, we cannot rule out the 
possibility that control rights are modified more often. 
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approach allows us to analyze contractual practices at the firm level and match them with other 
firm-level data.  
Innovation activities and outcomes are typically firm-level, as opposed to transaction-
level, phenomena. The survey dataset here aggregates transactions to a few key clients of each 
respondent. This allows us to estimate, first, the determinants of “typical” contractual practices, 
and, second, the effects of these contractual arrangements on innovation outcomes. The 
limitations of this approach include reliance on subjective assessments and aggregated 
tendencies, which both are likely to add noise to the data and make it more difficult to obtain 
significant results. However, there is no apparent reason why these data would be systematically 
biased. The survey questions, developed after interviews with business service CEOs, ask about 
contractual dimensions typically covered in service contracts. It should thus be relatively 
straightforward for respondents to answer these questions. 
The survey response rate was 42%. Based on information from Statistics Finland, the  
survey respondents represented slightly larger firms than the mean in the target group (29 vs. 24 
employees).6 However, in terms of profitability (sales per employee), firms in the sample 
actually performed slightly worse than the targeted group. The sample thus does not seem to be 
biased toward more successful firms. Results may be affected by the bias toward larger firms, 
however, to the extent that contractual practices influence firms’ probability of innovation 
differently for large and small service firms. This will be assessed in the empirical analysis. 
Additional data are available for the technical service industries in the sample. Table 1 
presents information from the representative Finnish Community Innovation Survey (CIS) (SF, 
                                                 
6 This average number of employees of the surveyed firms, 29, is different from that in table 1 because the Statistics 
Finland data are a few years older.  
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1998), which included the technical services industry (NACE 742: engineering and architectural 
services). Unfortunately, the other business service industries examined here were not included 
in the CIS sample. Available descriptive statistics for technical services, excluding architecture 
and construction, are presented in the last column of table 1. Compared to the CIS data, the firms 
in the survey data of engineering services used here are about equally large in terms of 
employees.7 This suggests that the possible large firm bias found earlier is not very significant. 
Furthermore, engineering firms in the current sample are on average about equally innovative as 
those in the CIS sample. The sampling method and data collection approach thus do not seem to 
have created any systematic biases, assuming that other industries in the sample are about as 
representative as engineering services. 
Descriptive statistics of the main dependent and explanatory variables are displayed in 
table 1. There is considerable variation across industries. Firms are typically rather small in 
industrial design8 and electrical engineering. Propensity to export also varies by industry. 
However, at the firm level, the picture is even more diverse: there are a handful of technologic-
ally-oriented firms in the sample that export all of their sales, while most firms export little. The 
business group variable is a binary indicator for firms that are subsidiaries of a service group. 
These firms are thus wholly or majority owned by other service firms or holding companies.  
The main variables of interest characterize the external control of service firms’ resources 
in terms of typical contractual features with the most important or “key” clients. Unfortunately, 
we have no information about how large a portion of sales these key clients represent. However, 
according to the supplementary interview evidence, most business service firms strive to form 
                                                 
7 The sales numbers are not directly comparable because of the different years of observation. 
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long-term relationships with important clients, because search and asymmetric information costs 
are substantial. As a result, relationships with key clients are likely to represent both a significant 
share of the service firm’s sales and a stream of repeated transactions.  
We focus on the allocation of control rights to project output and partial exclusivity 
restrictions regarding supply to the client’s competitors. These two aspects of external control 
were identified as relevant in the interviews with business service executives. The variable 
“output control rights to client” refers to a survey question asking how often the rights to 
control knowledge assets created in joint projects with key clients are transferred to the client 
(never, sometimes, often, or always). If the service firm always agrees to give the control 
rights to the service output—design, process plan, or technology—to key clients, it then gives 
up the possibility to re-use some of this accumulated knowledge. Another survey question 
asked how often the service firm agrees with key clients that it will not supply similar services 
to the clients’ competitors (never, sometimes, often, or always). These partial exclusivity 
clauses constrain the service supplier’s growth opportunities. These two control rights 
variables will first be used as dependent variables in the analyses of the determinants of 
control rights allocation and then as explanatory variables for innovation output. 
Handing control rights to clients is a rather common practice in business services (table 
1). The two ends of the spectrum are industrial design and R&D services. Designers tend to 
yield both types of control rights to clients, perhaps reflecting the low bargaining power of 
these small firms and the strategic importance of new product designs to clients. R&D service 
providers, in contrast, although contributing to clients’ R&D activities, are most likely to 
                                                                                                                                                             
8 Industrial design refers here to services contributing to aesthetic, ergonomic, and functional aspects of new 
products. These services are to be distinguished from more technologically-oriented engineering design and less 
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retain both types of control rights. Many R&D service firms develop proprietary service 
technologies, to which they retain rights after service projects are completed. 
We consider two measures of innovation output. These are binary indicators for firms 
that have launched new or significantly improved services. Survey questions asked whether the 
firm had introduced significantly improved services in the previous three years and whether it 
had introduced completely new services during the same time period (new to the firm itself, not 
necessarily to the market). These questions parallel those used in European Community 
Innovation Surveys, designed by the Eurostat and found to contain relevant information in a 
voluminous stream of research (see e.g., Mairesse & Mohnen, 2002; Veugelers & Cassiman, 
1999). About half of the firms surveyed here had launched new or improved services, more firms 
making improvements than launching new services, as one would expect. Management 
consultancies report particularly high rates of innovation. In contrast, electrical engineering firms 
appear less active in developing new services. These data on new or significantly improved 
services will be used as dependent variables to test hypotheses 4 and 5. 
To provide an idea of what kinds of service innovations the above variables may be 
capturing, the following examples for new services and service improvements were mentioned in 
interviews with business service executives. The CEO of a management consulting firm 
described a novel method of building work teams in organizations, associated with a special 
display board that visualizes and organizes the process. This firm had obtained a patent for the 
board. It licensed this service innovation and the boards to other management consulting firms. 
A shipbuilding engineering firm executive disclosed that the firm was in the process of 
developing a new service concept based on a life-cycle model for building large ships. The new 
                                                                                                                                                             
product development-oriented graphic design. However, overlapping areas of activity and expertise also exist. 
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service would optimize the construction process and materials use from the very beginning 
through the various stages of the ship’s life cycle all the way to its eventual disassembly and 
recycling of parts. A service improvement mentioned by another management consulting 
executive concerned applying an existing team-building process in a networked context. In other 
words, the firm developed a modified team-building service concept for clients who operate in 
multiple locations connected through an intranet communication network. Indeed, service 
improvements in many of the firms interviewed involved implementing information and 
communication technologies in the delivery of existing services.  
Insert table 1 about here 
Hypotheses 1–3 concern the effects of service firms’ indispensability, innovation capabilities, 
and bargaining power on the likelihood of retaining control rights to intellectual assets. To 
develop proxies for the indispensability of service firms, we use variables that characterize 
business service firms’ typical interactions with clients in projects. The underlying survey 
questions were developed based on interviews with CEOs. Most often, individual consultants 
from service firms are hired to join clients’ projects as outside experts. Then, consultants 
essentially work in client-led projects as supplementary human resources. In some cases, 
however, business service firms carry out projects for the client independently, that is, in 
relatively infrequent interaction with the client. The service provider can also provide project 
planning and design. The survey questionnaire asked respondents to indicate how often (never, 
sometimes, often, or always) their firm operates in these roles. It is argued that these aspects of 
the service relationship provide useful information regarding the parties’ relative contributions to 
service projects, in other words, their indispensability. Firms operating independently or 
providing project design are more indispensable than those operating as outside experts. 
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Explanatory variables related to firms’ innovation capabilities include measures for 
firms’ skill levels and service development activities. KIBS firms’ success in innovation and 
business operations depends to a very large degree on the skills and competencies of their 
employees and teams. Higher education is a critical source of skills for KIBS industries (see 
table 1). In an average firm, one third of KIBS employees have higher education (college or 
university) degrees, the median being 25%, and almost three percent of employees in the firms 
surveyed have post graduate (licentiate or Ph.D.) degrees. Research and service development 
activities by KIBS firms are also common and entail quite significant investments. 60% of firms 
report having invested in the development of their services, and 20% of firms have a permanent 
development team or department. The mean of service development expenditures is 6.3% of 
sales.9  
Bargaining power of the sampled service firms is proxied by a set of firm characteristics 
that measure firms’ reputation and position in the industry. These include firm size, profitability, 
ownership structure, export activity, and age. These variables are also included as control 
variables in explaining innovation outcomes. 
4 Empirical Analyses 
4.1 Empirical variables and models 
The empirical analyses in this section, first, examine the determinants of control rights allocation 
between service firms and their clients and, second,  the characteristics of innovating business 
service firms. For the latter analyses, we begin by assessing the endogeneity of control rights 
                                                 
9 Excluding three firms with R&D expenditures greater than or equal to sales yields mean R&D expenditures per 
sales of 2.9%. 
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allocation with respect to innovation output and then proceed to estimate a conditional maximum 
likelihood system of equations to account for that. Table 2 summarizes the variables used in the 
estimations for the final sample of 145 firms Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix display these 
estimation variables’ means, standard deviations, and correlations.  
Table 2 about here 
Equation 1 specifies the model for estimating the determinants of control rights division between 
the business service firm and its key clients. The alternative dependent variables include ordinal 
measures for how often the firm’s key clients obtain the rights to control intellectual assets 
created in joint projects (output control rights to client), how often the key clients specify 
exclusivity arrangements preventing the firm from serving the client’s competitors (partial 
exclusivity), and the sum of these two variables (control rights).  
Equation 1   CONTROL RIGHTS TO CLIENT = f[0 + 1 * log(EMPL) (-) + 2 * GROUP (-)  
+ 3 * EXPORTS (-) + 4 * PROFITABILITY (-) + 5 * AGE (-)  
+ 6 * HIGHER EDUCATION (-) + 7 * POSTGRAD EDUCATION (-)  
+ 8 * R&D DEPARTMENT (-) + 9 * R&D INVESTMENTS (-) 
+ 10 * PROJECT DESIGN (-)+ 11 * INDEPENDENT (-)  
+ 12 * QUALITY SYSTEM (+) + 13…17 * Industry dummies + 1] 
 
Explanatory variables in equation 1 include firm size, group structure, exports, profitability, and 
firm age, all of which signal the firm’s established position and reputation in the industry and 
thus improve its chances of retaining control rights through bargaining power. Their expected 
sign is thus negative (per hypothesis 3). Size and profitability are correlated with market power 
in mainstream economic theories of industrial organization: larger firms have greater market 
shares that directly imply market power, and the ability to price above marginal cost reflects 
market power and translates into higher profits. Absence of liquidity constraints may also 
improve a firm’s bargaining position. Moreover, as firms in most areas of knowledge-based 
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business services depend largely on their reputations to obtain new clients, a good reputation 
implies bargaining power. Newly founded business service providers are less likely to have built 
solid reputations than their more established counterparts, so we assume that age is associated 
with bargaining power with clients. The extent to which these proxies of bargaining power are 
significant explanatory variables measures the departure from theoretically optimal allocation 
based on relative capabilities to innovate and invest in the project. 
The contributions made by service firms in client projects may influence their control-
rights outcomes. Firms operating independently or providing project design are assumed to be 
relatively indispensable with respect to project outcomes and thus more likely to retain control 
rights (per hypothesis 1). Knowledge creation activities are also expected to improve the firm’s 
likelihood of retaining control rights, but for a conceptually different reason. Highly skilled and 
R&D-active firms are expected to be more innovative in client relationships, hence their 
investments may be more critical for the success of the relationship than those of their clients. 
Highly innovative service firms should thus be made residual claimants (hypothesis 2).  
The second empirical model (equation 2) specifies firms’ innovation output as a function 
of their general and structural characteristics, allocation of control rights to clients in contracts, 
and knowledge creation activities. The expected signs of coefficients are in parentheses.  
Equation 2 INNOVATION OUTPUT = f(0 + 1 * log(EMPL) (+) + 2 * GROUP (+)  
 + 3 * EXPORTS (+) + 4 * PROFITABILITY (+)  
 + 5 * R&D DEPARTMENT (+) + 6 * R&D INTENSITY (+)  
 + 7 * HIGHER EDUCATION (+) + 8 * POSTGRAD EDUCATION (+)  
 +  * CONTROL RIGHTS TO CLIENT (-) + 9…13 * Industry dummies + u2 ) 
 
There are two innovation output measures: a dummy for firms that significantly improved 
existing services (IMPROVEMENT) and a dummy for firms that launched new services in the 
markets in the previous three years (NEW SERVICE). Improvements are arguably more 
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incremental service developments than are new service introductions, which require a successful 
departure from existing service activities and competencies. 
Control variables include firm size, which correlates positively with the probability of 
innovation if there are increasing returns to scale in innovation activities. We use the logarithm 
of the number of employees to reduce skewness. Members of domestic or international business 
groups may benefit from knowledge flows from the headquarters’ R&D function, hence the 
expected sign for group is positive.10 Operating in export markets is expected to provide 
incentives to create new and innovative services, as in existing studies of manufacturing 
industries. Profitability of the firm may also influence its ability to engage in innovation 
activities. Finally, knowledge creation investments in the form of investing in service 
development (R&D department, R&D intensity) or hiring skilled employees (higher and post 
graduate education) are expected to improve the likelihood of successful innovation. However, 
extant literature suggests that in service firms, R&D activities tend to be less prominent in the 
innovation process, and organization of innovation is “ad hoc” (Sundbo, 1997). This would mean 
that investments in formal service development are not important for innovation success. 
Empirical tests will assess this conjecture. 
The explanatory variables of interest in equation 2 include the indicators for control 
rights allocation in client relationships. Hypotheses 4 and 5 implied that relationships where 
clients control the output or supply create weaker incentives to innovate for the service supplier, 
                                                 
10 This is likely to be a significant phenomenon particularly in internationally operating advertising and management 
consulting companies, where group structure is prevalent and knowledge creation can partly be centralized to a 
shared R&D facility. For example, strategy consultancies McKinsey and Boston Consulting Group each have in-
house research institutes that deliver generally applicable information and tools to their consultants. As a result, 
local subsidiaries of these kinds of global consulting firms benefit from knowledge flows from the headquarters. 
However, most of the (local) companies in the sample used here do not have permanent in-house R&D teams or 
facilities. 
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because the possibilities to use the results repeatedly and cumulatively are constrained. The 
expected coefficient is thus negative. We rely on the combined Control rights variable (the sum 
of Output control rights to client and Partial exclusivity), which ranges from 0 to 6. The 
justification for this is that the two forms of contractual arrangements are rather strongly 
correlated and conceptually assumed to measure the same underlying concept: the degree to 
which clients can control the service firm’s use of its intellectual assets. While the statistical 
scale of the combined variable is still ordinal, its range of variation is more extensive than in the 
case of the original survey variables. 
Control rights are expected to be endogenous in the model for innovation output. This is 
the case if the control rights variable is correlated with the error term in equation 2. This can be 
tested and accounted for with an instrumental variable approach. The challenge is to find a valid 
instrument. Particularly in a cross-sectional setup, this is often tricky. We carry out the 
instrumental variable estimation with the following two instruments: quality system adoption 
and project design (planning) role. 
Quality system adoption is assumed to proxy for a strategy of customizing services, 
which is conceptually and empirically associated with control right allocation but not with 
innovation activities. Quality system is a binary variable for whether the firm has implemented 
such a system to improve the consistency of its service operations and to signal high quality to 
potential clients. This variable is expected to be positively related to yielding control rights to 
clients, because it is associated with service firms whose strategic focus is on customization 
rather than services that are intended for replication and thus benefit from retention of control 
rights. Providers of customized services are more likely to need the high quality signal created 
by quality system adoption than are providers of standardized or packaged services. Providers of 
 24
customized services are also less dependent on the rights to control their output; in fact, they are 
often transferred to clients with the service project output. Unfortunately, the dataset contains no 
direct indicator of service customization. Therefore, quality systems are assumed to proxy 
customization and expected to be negatively associated with yielding control rights to clients.  
The second instrument, project design, is based on a survey question of how regularly the 
service firm designs projects for their key clients. This question is on a four-point scale, ranging 
from 0 (never) to 3 (always). We assume that firms that design new projects for their clients are 
more indispensable in these projects, and, therefore, more likely to retain control rights in their 
client relationships. This is analogous to the measure used by Lerner and Merges (1998: 138) to 
distinguish early and late stage research. Lerner and Merges argue that control rights in very 
early discovery stage research projects should be allocated to the R&D firm because of the 
marginal impact of their research effort on the value of the project outcome is greater. Similarly, 
in the early stages of service projects, the service provider has a greater opportunity to influence 
the project outcome, and, hence, is more indispensable. 
Regarding the empirical validity of these instrumental variables, neither variable is 
statistically different from zero when included in equation 2 estimating service innovation, 
although this test is by no means sufficient to establish validity. The more important 
consideration is conceptual. We are not aware of conceptual arguments suggesting that quality 
system adoption (or service customization that it proxies) or providing early-stage project design 
services for clients directly influence innovation output. First, there is a priori no reason to 
expect customized service providers (say, Bain & Company in management consulting) to be 
more or less innovative in terms of improving or renewing their services than more standardized 
service providers (say, Accenture in the same industry). Both types of firms should benefit from 
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improved or new services, although the types of innovations they generate are probably 
different. Second, there is no reason to think that early-stage interventions in client projects lead 
to more or less service innovation than late-stage interventions. As an example here, one could 
think of an industrial design firm that contributes to the client’s new product development 
project at a stage where technical product specifications are yet to be defined, rather than 
providing product designs according to the set specifications. Both types of service suppliers 
should benefit from improved processes or new service concepts.  
These variables should thus in principle be valid instruments in the estimation of control 
rights allocation. However, project design services may be correlated with innovation 
capabilities, because they are likely to be provided by larger and more established firms. Project 
design services are associated with greater uncertainty about service quality compared to 
projects where clients lead and closely monitor service delivery. Large and established firms 
have greater reputations than small and young firms, but they are also more likely to have 
innovation capabilities. Controlling for other firm characteristics is therefore important. 
However, for firms of similar size and reputation, those providing early-stage project services 
should not be any more likely to innovate than those providing later-stage project services. Other 
firm characteristics (firm size, age, profitability, employee skills, R&D intensity, export 
capacity, and group affiliation) are also expected to influence control rights outcomes, but they 
may affect innovation output directly, too, and therefore would not be valid as instruments. 
4.2 Estimation methods 
We first estimate the determinants of the ordinal dependent variables related to equation 1 with 
ordered probit maximum likelihood method. We then proceed to test for the endogeneity of 
control rights in equation 2 and develop an instrumental variable approach to account for this 
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issue. According to Wooldridge (2002) and Rivers and Vuong (1988), endogeneity of a 
continuous variable in a probit model can easily be tested with a two-stage approach. If the error 
terms in equations 1 and 2 are correlated, then the control rights variable is endogenous. This can 
be assessed by first estimating equation 1 and then inserting the residuals as an additional 
explanatory variable into equation 2. Statistical significance of the residuals would indicate 
endogeneity. 
Endogeneity in a model with a binary dependent variable can be corrected with two-stage 
methods (Maddala, 1983) or conditional maximum likelihood. The advantage of the latter 
method is, first, higher efficiency and, second, that one can obtain direct estimates of  (the 
coefficient of control rights in equation 2) and the 0…13 parameters. Two-stage methods only 
yield these parameters up to a scale. Wooldridge (2002) derives the likelihood function under the 
joint distribution of the dependent variables in equations 1 and 2 (control rights and innovation). 
In addition to the parameters of interest in equations 1 and 2, this method generates estimates for 
the correlation  between the error terms (u, ) and variance 2 of . If these parameters are 
relevant, accounting for them increases the accuracy of the estimates. This procedure was 
programmed and estimated with RATS v. 4.30. We sketch the conditional likelihood estimation 
approach below by rewriting empirical equations 1 and 2 (cf. Wooldridge 2005: 476) as: 
(1’) y1 = z1δ1 + z2δ2 + υ1 = zδ + υ1 
(2’) y2* = z1β + αy1 + u2;  y2 = 1[y 2* >0] 
Rewrite the second equation when the error terms are correlated as: 
(2’’) y2* = z1β + αy1 + θυ1 + e2   ;  y2 = 1[y 2* >0] 
 where   e2|z, y1, υ1 ~ Normal(0,1- ρ2) and   θ = ρ/τ 
To derive the joint distribution of (y1, y2), Wooldridge exploits that: 
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(3) f(y1, y2|z) = f(y2| y1,z) f(y1|z) 
and the conditional density of y2 given (y1,z), which is: 
P(y2 = 1| y1, z) = Φ[(z1β + αy1 +(ρ/τ)( y1 - zδ))/(1- ρ2)1/2] = Φ[w] 
The log likelihood function to be maximized in the estimation is then obtained by taking the 
natural logarithm of:  
(4) f(y1, y2|z) = Φ(w)y2 {1- Φ(w)}1-y2 (1/τ) φ[(y1 - zδ)/τ] 
4.3 Estimation results 
We first estimate the determinants of control rights allocation. Table 3 presents the results for 
equation 1, with three different ordinal dependent variables. The estimation method is ordinal 
probit maximum likelihood. We include two measures to capture the role of the service provider 
in clients’ projects: project design and independent. Both are negatively associated with control 
rights signed away to clients, but only project design is statistically significantly so. This 
variable is strongly associated with output control rights and the combined control right 
variable—supporting the first hypothesis—but it only has a weak negative effect on the 
likelihood of partial exclusivity arrangements. 
Regarding the innovation capability hypothesis (H2), having an institutionalized R&D 
department and providing R&D services are negatively and significantly associated with 
yielding the rights to control intellectual output to clients, lending support for hypothesis 2. 
However, partial exclusivity arrangements are not affected by these innovation capabilities. 
Finally, bargaining power measured by profitability significantly explains output control 
allocation and the combined control variable, and firm age is significant in these models as well. 
Additionally, exporting service firms are significantly less likely to agree to partial exclusivity. 
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These coefficients support hypothesis 3: bargaining power helps service firms to retain control 
rights. Firm size measured by the logarithm of employees is positively related to yielding control 
rights to clients, contrary to expectations, although the coefficient is marginally significant only 
in the last specification. If profitability and age are removed from the specification, the 
coefficient of firm size becomes much smaller and highly insignificant. These results suggest 
that bargaining power based on financial performance and established position in the industry 
are more relevant than sheer size.  
Table 3 
These estimation results broadly align with hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 in terms of coefficient 
signs, but their statistical significance varies with the dependent variable used. Nevertheless, all 
but two coefficients have the same signs in the three specifications, and these two coefficients 
are practically zero (export dummy in the first model and R&D department in the second model). 
Additionally, all models in table 3 include the quality system variable that was expected to be 
positively related to yielding control rights to clients. This variable is positively and significantly 
associated with the combined control rights variable, and weakly significant in the partial 
exclusivity specification.  
Inserting the residuals from the estimation model for combined control rights into probit 
specifications for new services and service improvement suggests that control rights are probably 
endogenous. The coefficient of the residuals obtains a statistical significance level of 93% in 
both models (see table A3 in the appendix). Therefore, we next estimate the effect of control 
rights on innovation using the conditional maximum likelihood approach. Table 4 reports these 
results. Results from single equation probit and OLS models are used as starting values. 
Table 4 about here 
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The predicted value for control rights obtains a negative and statistically significant 
coefficient in the conditional likelihood models for both service improvements and new service 
introductions, aligned with hypothesis 4. The results are also in line with the fifth hypothesis: 
The effect of predicted control rights is slightly larger in explaining new services than in 
explaining service improvements. These results are also qualitatively similar to the earlier single-
equation results for control rights: profitability, firm age, and quality system are statistically 
significantly associated with control rights allocation. In contrast, the project design instrument 
works well only in the conditional likelihood model for new services. Also, variables measuring 
innovation capability remain statistically insignificant in explaining control rights allocation 
here. 
Regarding the control variables in the innovation equation, few variables are significant 
in explaining both service improvements and new service introductions. Business group structure 
and export intensity significantly explain service improvement, while higher education of 
employees is important for new service introduction.  
The age variable was not included as an explanatory variable of innovation output, as it is 
not a standard explanatory factor behind innovation. However, Sorensen and Stuart (2000) 
suggest that there is a link between firm age and innovativeness. In supplementary analyses the 
age variable was therefore included in both equations 1 and 2. This had no effect on the results 
concerning the impact of control rights allocation on service improvements. The coefficient of 
age in explaining new services or service improvements was not significantly different from 
zero.  
As another robustness analysis, we experimented with an additional service strategy 
variable in order to make sure that firms’ service strategy is not causing both control rights 
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allocation and innovation. Löwendahl (1997) has argued that for professional services, the 
choice between individual or organizational control of key resources is central in determining 
strategic orientation. In earlier studies (Leiponen, 2006a; 2006b), a variable describing business 
service firms’ strategic focus on individual control of resources was found to influence their 
strategies regarding control rights allocation and innovation. This dimension was approximated 
in the current dataset by the survey question “how often can your firm’s cooperation with key 
clients be described as participating in client projects as outside experts.” In the Aghion and 
Tirole (1994) framework, this survey question can be seen to reflect a situation where the service 
provider does not take major responsibility regarding the project outcome. This “outside expert” 
variable was found to weakly and positively influence control rights allocation, but it had no 
effect on innovation outcomes, the instrumental variables, or the main results concerning the 
relationship between control rights and innovation.11 
In the nonresponse analysis it was found that the sample may be slightly biased toward 
large firms. To see if this had an effect on the results, we formed an interaction term for the 
natural logarithm of employees and the combined control rights indicator. The interaction term 
was not significantly different from zero, suggesting that the main result concerning the effect of 
control rights allocation on innovation outcomes is not different for small and large firms. 
Considering that there are significant differences across industries with respect to both 
control rights allocation and innovation, we performed some final robustness checks by 
interacting the key explanatory variables with industry dummies to allow for their effects to vary 
across industries. We focus on the consistency of the effects of the instrumental variables project 
                                                 
11 All of these supplementary results are available from the author on request. 
 31
design and quality system on control rights, and on the consistency of the effect of the control 
rights variable on innovation outcomes.  
Regarding the instrumental variables, we found that in linear (OLS) models of control 
rights, the project design variable had a negative coefficient in five of the six industries. The 
magnitudes of these negative coefficients varied between -0.340 and -0.551. Only in the 
electrical engineering industry did we obtain a positive coefficient of 0.265. This industry may 
thus be an outlier. Similarly, the quality system variable obtained positive coefficients from five 
out of six industries, and the negative coefficient for the machine and process engineering was 
not very significant. We also estimated with these industry-specific coefficients for the 
instruments in the conditional likelihood instrumental variable model, but they had no effect on 
the main results in the innovation equation.  
We also allowed the effect of control rights on innovation outcomes vary across 
industries. It was difficult to obtain robust coefficients for industrial design and R&D services, 
the two smallest subsamples, so we estimated one coefficient for the whole sample and separate 
coefficients for firms in advertising, engineering, or management consulting industries. In the 
conditional likelihood models of innovation output, all industry-specific coefficients on control 
rights were negative. Thus, while there is some variation across industries in the strength of the 
effect, the relationship between control rights and innovation is negative in all industries.  
The performance of the second instrumental variable (project design) was not completely 
satisfactory in the analyses. It is significant only at the 90% level in the model for service 
improvements. However, this variable does appear to work well in the model for new services. 
Moreover, it is not significantly correlated with the residuals in either equation (its correlation 
coefficient is -5.5% with service improvement residuals and -9.8% with new service introduction 
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residuals), which increases our confidence in its performance. Quality system variable, on the 
other hand, worked slightly better in the model for service improvements than in the model for 
new services. Thus, although each instrument has its shortcomings, taken together, we have 
somewhat greater confidence that these two variables are able to identify exogenous variation in 
control rights in the conditional maximum likelihood models.  
Finally, the ρ parameter in the conditional maximum likelihood estimation suggests that 
the residuals (error terms) in the two equations are strongly correlated. This means that there are 
omitted variables or unobserved firm heterogeneity that impact both control right allocation and 
innovation outcomes. We probably could account for such unobserved characteristics only with 
panel data or some type of a natural experiment. The ρ parameter thus reminds us of the 
limitations of the current research design: the cross-sectional models are unlikely to be able to 
account for all factors that affect control rights and innovation. Only to the degree that the 
instrumental variables are able to identify exogenous variation in control rights, we have 
correctly estimated the effect of control rights on innovation outcomes. 
5 Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
This paper examines the determinants and effects of contractual arrangements in business-to-
business service relationships. The empirical context of study is knowledge-intensive business 
services. The study focuses on contractual features concerning the control and use of intellectual 
assets in client relationships. These are found to have significant effects on business service 
firms’ innovation outcomes. Theoretical work in economics has focused on performance 
contracts as a source of incentives in economic relationships, but these kinds of contracts may be 
impractical in many situations due to measurement problems and other sources of 
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incompleteness. In contrast, this study argues that control rights to service supply or output are 
significantly associated with incentives to innovate and could be strategically used to generate 
incentives for knowledge suppliers or cooperation partners.  
Cross-sectional instrumental variable estimation results indicate that service firms who 
operate under tight client control of service supply or output are significantly less likely to 
introduce new services or improve existing services. Marginal effects from single-equation 
models suggest that the probability of introducing new services in firms that always yield control 
rights to their clients is 20-30% lower than in firms that never or only occasionally yield control 
rights. Contractual arrangements can thus have dynamic ramifications through service 
innovation.  
The results also show that contractual arrangements depend on the service firm’s 
bargaining power, R&D orientation, and role in client projects. First, bargaining power measured 
by firm age and profitability increases the likelihood of retaining control rights. These results 
may reflect suboptimal division of control rights. Relative abilities to invest in noncontractible 
activities, not bargaining power, should socially optimally be the basis of control right 
allocation. According to marginal effect estimates from single-equation probit models, 
misallocation of control rights because of bargaining power differences implies up to 23% 
smaller probability of service innovation. In terms of our measures of bargaining power, the 
marginal effect estimates suggest that firms whose profitability is one standard deviation lower 
than the mean are 14% less likely to retain rights to service output and 2% less likely to avoid 
exclusivity restrictions. The social welfare reduction due to control right misallocation is 
probably smaller than that implied by the above numbers, however, because when the service 
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firm loses the rights and the associated incentive to innovate, the client firm obtains them and, as 
a result, is more likely to innovate than without the rights. 
Second, the noncontractible investments that should optimally be the basis for control 
right allocation were proxied by R&D activities and project roles. The presence of an R&D unit 
and the industry segment of R&D services, not R&D investments or research skill intensity per 
se, turn out to explain the division of control rights, but not very consistently. We thus have 
limited evidence for the hypothesis that the ability to innovate is driving control right allocation, 
although this result may be specific to the sample of business service firms used here.12 
Regarding project roles, service firms that often or always take on project responsibility in terms 
of designing the clients’ projects are significantly more likely to retain control rights. This result 
is aligned with the property-rights theoretic prediction that the party who is more 
“indispensable” in terms of project outcome should be the residual claimant.  
Quality system adoption may also proxy for a different aspect of the services offered: 
firms that find the signaling associated with quality systems valuable for their competitiveness 
are likely to provide customized services, where clients usually obtain control rights, particularly 
exclusivity. Quality system adoption and project design role were used as instrumental variables 
in the conditional likelihood models. In each conditional likelihood model, at least one of these 
variables is significant at the 95% level, and neither variable is significantly correlated with the 
residuals of the innovation outcome models. At least superficially, thus, it appears that we are 
able to identify the variation in control rights allocation that is exogeneous to innovation 
outcomes. In principle, however, such firm-specific instruments are not ideal. Their complete 
                                                 
12 With data of biotechnology firms, Lerner and Merges (1998) found that if firms were strong both in terms of their 
financial and patent positions (an interaction effect), they were more likely to retain control rights. 
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exogeneity with respect to innovation output cannot be ascertained, and it is possible that we 
have not fully accounted for endogeneity. Thus, the most cautious interpretation of the results is 
that innovative service firms tend to retain control rights to their intellectual assets, but the 
direction of causality is not firmly  established—it may run in both directions. Only to the extent 
that the instruments identify exogenous changes in control rights do the conditional likelihood 
estimations express the statistical significance and magnitude of the causality from control rights 
to innovation output. More conclusive answers can probably only be obtained with longitudinal 
or transaction-level data from multiple service firms. 
The novel management implication of these results for client firms is that incentives for 
noncontractible investments should be considered when long-term contracts with knowledge 
suppliers are crafted. In long-term service supply relationships, the client may sometimes benefit 
more from an accelerated pace of knowledge creation by the service supplier than from tight 
control of existing intellectual assets. How to balance these factors depends on the relative 
innovativeness of the partners.  
These results on the external control of resources resonate with those by Bakos and 
Brynjolfsson (1993), who argue in a study of information technology supplier relations that 
client firms may benefit from reducing their own bargaining power by limiting the number of 
suppliers. Having fewer suppliers gives each supplier stronger incentives to invest in 
noncontractible activities such as innovation and quality improvement. More generally, 
optimizing long-term relationships with knowledge-intensive and innovative suppliers requires 
consideration of suppliers’ incentives to learn and innovate. Control rights to intellectual assets 
can be one way to boost these incentives. 
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To conclude, this study suggests that there are significant interactions between 
organizational arrangements in supplier relationships and noncontractible activities such as 
service innovation and improvement. The results in this paper align with those of Lerner and 
Merges (1998) that control rights are not only allocated based on the relative abilities of the 
parties to innovate or contribute to the project, but also based on their bargaining positions. 
Furthermore, the most novel results in this paper show that control rights allocation is 
significantly associated with innovation outcomes. While tightly controlling intellectual assets 
may often be strategically important for business service firms’ clients, the clients should 
balance this strategic goal against the benefits from a more optimal allocation of control rights in 
terms of the incentives to innovate created for their repeated service suppliers. 
 37
Table 1 Descriptive statistics by industry 
 All 
firms 
Industrial
Design 
Adver-
tising 
Management
consulting 
R&D  
services 
Machine, 
process 
engineering 
Electrical 
engineering 
Engineering 
services 
combined 
Engineering 
services in Finnish 
CIS  (1996) 
Sales MFIM (1999) 28.936 2.81 45.37 37.78 16.39 32.69 9.82 23.32 60.42 
Employees (1999) 44.77 6.70 37.22 55.00 36.82 77.33 23.62 54.81 56.85 
Export share (1999) 0.125 0.018 0.011 0.083 0.338 0.229 0.118 0.182 0.273 
Sales/employee (MFIM) 0.692 0.324 0.987 0.996 0.583 0.534 0.408 0.481 1.088 
Firm age (1999) 18.01 13.50 17.28 20.50 23.41 17.14 16.00 16.66 n.a. 
Business group 0.414 0.200 0.500 0.500 0.294 0.444 0.269 0.371 n.a. 
Service improvements  0.566 0.200 0.667 0.813 0.588 0.528 0.385 0.468 n.a. 
New service introductions 0.483 0.600 0.472 0.625 0.588 0.472 0.192 0.354 0.385 
R&D investments/sales  0.063 0.025 0.014 0.028 0.385 0.022 0.022 0.022 0.027 
R&D department or team  0.200 0.200 0.139 0.188 0.294 0.194 0.192 0.193 n.a. 
Higher education degrees 
(% of employees) 32.76 65.90 25.69 64.97 42.29 21.53 23.35 
 
22.29 
 
55.74 
Post graduate education (% of 
employees) 2.46 5.00 1.03 2.25 11.82 0.64 0.33 0.52 
 
n.a. 
Independent service provision 1.83 2.22 1.74 1.44 1.94 1.92 1.83 1.88 n.a. 
Project design 1.37 1.20 1.53 1.50 1.41 1.39 1.12 1.27 n.a. 
Quality system 0.41 0.20 0.09 0.60 0.59 0.31 0.56 0.64 n.a. 
Output control rights to client 2.21 2.80 2.43 2.06 1.71 2.21 2.08 2.15 n.a. 
Partial exclusivity 1.28 2.50 1.81 1.84 1.12 2.03 1.75 1.92 n.a. 
Response rate (%) 42 41 41 35 48 51 40 46 71 (all service 
industries) 
N 145 10 39 16 17 35 24 59 39 
n.a. = not available 
Output control rights to client, partial exclusivity, project design, and independent service provision have four-point scales ranging between 0–3 (never, 
sometimes, often, always). 
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Table 2 Estimation variables  
 Variable Description Role in equation 1 Role in equation 2 
Innovation 
outcomes 
Improvement Significant service improvements (0/1) Not included Dependent variable 1 
New service New service introductions (0/1) Not included Dependent variable 2 
Basic firm 
Characteristics 
Log(employees) Log(number of employees) 1999 Proxy for bargaining power (H3) Control variable 
Export intensity Exports per sales 1999 Not included Control variable 
Exports>0 Any exports in 1999 (0/1) Proxy for bargaining power (H3) Not included 
Business group Subsidiary or member in a business group Proxy for bargaining power (H3) Control variable 
Profitability Sales/employee 1999 Proxy for bargaining power (H3) Control variable 
Age Age of the firm 1999 (years) Proxy for bargaining power (H3) Not included 
Quality system Firm has adopted a quality system (0/1) Instrumental variable Not included 
 
Output control 
rights to client 
“How often does your key or most important client 
obtain the control rights to intellectual output: 
never, sometimes, often, or always?” (0–3) 
Dependent variable 1 Not included 
Control rights 
Partial exclusivity “How often do you sign an agreement which 
specifies that you will not provide services to your 
key client’s competitors: never, sometimes, often, 
or always?” (0–3) 
Dependent variable 2 Not included 
 Control rights The sum of output control rights to client and 
partial exclusivity (0–6) 
Dependent variable 3 Key explanatory 
variable  (H4, H5) 
 R&D department The firm has a permanent service development 
team or department (0/1) 
Proxy for innovation capability 
(H2) 
Control variable 
Knowledge 
creation 
R&D intensity Service development investments/sales (%) Not included Control variable 
R&D investments>0 Any R&D investments in 1999 (0/1) Proxy for innovation capability 
(H2) 
Not included 
 Higher education Share of employees with higher education (%) Proxy for innovation capability 
(H2) 
Control variable 
 Post grad education Share of employees with post graduate degrees 
(%) 
Proxy for innovation capability 
(H2) 
Control variable 
Role in service 
projects 
Independent Service projects are carried out independently 
from client (0–3: never, sometimes, often, always) 
Proxy for indispensability (H3) Not included 
Project design Service provider designs projects for clients (0–3) Proxy for indispensability (H3); 
instrumental variable 
Not included 
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Table 3 Determinants of control rights allocation 
Dependent variable OUTPUT CONTROL  
RIGHTS TO CLIENT PARTIAL EXCLUSIVITY CONTROL RIGHTS 
 Coeff.  Std.Err. Coeff.  Std.Err. Coeff.  Std.Err. 
Constant 3.740 *** 0.629 1.351 ** 0.584 3.706 *** 0.537 
Log(employees) 0.153  0.114 0.149  0.116 0.198 * 0.106 
Business group 0.088  0.216 0.341  0.218 0.282  0.200 
Exports>0 0.019  0.238 -0.506 ** 0.241 -0.325  0.220 
Profitability -0.447 *** 0.166 -0.175  0.170 -0.406 *** 0.154 
Age -0.018 ** 0.008 -0.014 * 0.008 -0.020 *** 0.007 
R&D department -0.534 ** 0.253 0.019  0.256 -0.162  0.237 
R&D investments>0  -0.162  0.218 -0.021  0.217 -0.110  0.201 
Higher education 0.004  0.004 0.002  0.004 0.006  0.004 
Post graduate education -0.003  0.018 -0.001  0.016 -0.005  0.015 
Independent  -0.118  0.137 -0.079  0.140 -0.120  0.127 
Project design -0.346 ** 0.144 -0.096  0.141 -0.260 ** 0.132 
Quality system 0.301  0.238 0.409 * 0.238 0.439 ** 0.222 
Advertising -0.302  0.459 -0.289  0.431 -0.245  0.394 
Machine and process engineering -1.061 ** 0.492 -0.257  0.451 -0.564  0.415 
Electrical engineering -1.271 *** 0.484 -0.512  0.442 -0.774 * 0.416 
Management consulting -1.024 ** 0.496 -0.478  0.477 -0.780 * 0.435 
R&D services -1.427 *** 0.517 -0.358  0.471 -0.836 * 0.436 
Log likelihood -147.34   -144.636   -232.25   
Threshold parameters μ(1)  1.065*** μ(1)  
1.205**
* μ(1)  0.910 
 μ(2)  2.374***   μ(2)  1.695 
    μ(3)  2.485 
      μ(4)  3.061 
      Mu(5)  3.636 
         
Notes: *** denotes 99% significance, ** denotes 95% significance, * denotes 90% significance levels.  145 observations. In the Partial Exclusivity model, 
categories 1 and 2 of the original survey variable were combined to improve the prediction power of the model (the estimation with the original variable was not 
able to distinguish between the two middle categories). Estimated with ordered probit ML. The reference industry is industrial design.   
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Table 4 Conditional maximum likelihood estimation of service innovation and control rights using quality system and 
project design as the instrumental variables 
 Control rights and service improvement  Control rights and new service introduction 
Dependent variable CONTROL RIGHTS  IMPROVEMENT  CONTROL RIGHTS  NEW SERVICE 
                
Variable Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error  Coeff.  Std. error 
Constant 5.086 *** 0.744  1.156  0.922  5.105 *** 0.752  2.233 *** 0.732 
Log(employees) 0.244 * 0.140  0.265  0.121  0.269 * 0.147  0.203 * 0.109 
Business group 0.409  0.297  0.718 *** 0.278  0.397  0.281  0.408 * 0.248 
Exports>0 -0.523 * 0.267     -0.467  0.288    
Export intensity     -0.951 ** 0.438     -0.593  0.470 
Profitability -0.507 ** 0.197  -0.108  0.181  -0.517 *** 0.160  -0.287  0.216 
Age -0.024 ** 0.011     -0.026 ** 0.011    
Higher education 0.007  0.005  0.007  0.005  0.007  0.005  0.012 ** 0.006 
Post grad education -0.007  0.034  0.018  0.023  -0.007  0.034  -0.023  0.030 
R&D department -0.095  0.379  0.628  0.411  -0.165  0.345  0.071  0.321 
R&D investments>0 -0.376  0.255     -0.155  0.249    
R&D intensity     1.227  2.786     0.586  1.995 
Quality system 0.631 ** 0.265     0.580 ** 0.277    
Project design -0.203  0.139     -0.347 ** 0.143    
Independent  -0.123  0.148     -0.117  0.152    
Predicted control rights     -0.600 *** 0.131     -0.623 *** 0.127 
Advertising -0.384  0.564  0.303  0.469  -0.340  0.574  -0.524  0.433 
Machine and process 
engineering -0.659  0.673  0.185  0.514  -0.698  0.675  -0.498  0.468 
Electrical engineering -1.064  0.692  0.031  0.539  -1.024  0.671  -1.057 * 0.546 
Management consulting -0.956  0.585  0.143  0.574  -0.941  0.590  -0.749  0.554 
R&D services -1.078  0.667  -0.244  0.698  -1.123 * 0.672  -0.670  0.551 
2 1.338 *** 0.111     1.331 *** 0.112    
 0.810 *** 0.127      0.681 *** 0.191     
Log likelihood -183.16        -199.236       
Note: Estimation method is conditional ML. *** denotes 99% significance, ** denotes 95% significance, * denotes 90% significance levels.  
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The reference industry is industrial design. In the control rights equation, dummy variables were used for exports and R&D investments instead of their 
intensities, because these were found to capture more of the variation than the intensity variables. However, other coefficients are not affected by this. Same 
results are obtained for the innovation output models with dummy or intensity variables. 
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Appendix 
Table A1 Descriptive statistics for estimation variables 
Variable Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. Obs. 
IMPROVEMENT 0.566 0.497 0 1 145 
NEW SERVICE 0.483 0.501 0 1 145 
Log(EMPLOYEES) 2.974 1.182 0 6.380 145 
BUSINESS GROUP 0.414 0.494 0 1 145 
EXPORT INTENSITY 0.125 0.267 0 1 145 
EXPORTS>0 0.331 0.472 0 1 145 
PROFITABILITY 0.692 0.629 0 4.429 145 
AGE 18.007 14.391 2 90 145 
R&D INTENSITY 0.063 0.344 0 4.000 145 
R&D DEPARTMENT 0.200 0.401 0 1 145 
R&D INVESTMENTS>0 0.600 0.492 0 1 145 
HIGHER EDUCATION 32.759 30.200 0 100 145 
POST GRAD EDUCATION 2.462 6.895 0 50 145 
CONTROL RIGHTS 4.069 1.517 0 6 145 
OUTPUT CONTROL RIGHTS 
TO CLIENT 2.210 0.812 0 3 145 
PARTIAL EXCLUSIVITY 1.276 0.722 0 2 145 
INDEPENDENT 1.828 0.739 0 3 145 
PROJECT DESIGN 1.372 0.716 0 3 145 
QUALITY SYSTEM 0.407 0.493 0 1 145 
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Table A2 Pairwise correlation matrix for estimation variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. IMPROVEMENT 1        
2. NEW SERVICE 0.4113** 1       
3. Log(EMPLOYEES) 0.2877** 0.1748* 1      
4. BUSINESS GROUP 0.2740** 0.119 0.4270** 1     
5. EXPORT INTENSITY -0.0613 -0.1099 0.1005 0.1514 1    
6. PROFITABILITY 0.1544 0.0993 -0.072 0.0416 0.0585 1   
7. AGE 0.1753* 0.1867* 0.4117** 0.2317** -0.1322 -0.0748 1  
8. R&D INTENSITY -0.0329 0.1192 0.0162 -0.0662 -0.0056 -0.0929 -0.0441 1 
9. R&D DEPARTMENT 0.2213** 0.0926 0.058 0.0027 0.1165 -0.0066 -0.1583* 0.2025* 
10. HIGHER EDUCATION 0.1169 0.1768* -0.0815 0.0105 0.0045 0.0768 0.0463 0.0503 
11. POST GRAD EDUC. -0.0371 -0.0742 -0.1332 -0.0476 0.1964* -0.0227 -0.0863 0.2898** 
12. CONTROL RIGHTS -0.0154 -0.1061 0.1409 0.1438 -0.1662 -0.1927* -0.0247 -0.0615 
13. OUTPUT CONTROL TO 
CLIENT -0.0941 -0.1266 0.0559 0.0587 -0.0923 -0.1346 -0.0424 -0.2283**
14. PARTIAL EXCLUSIVITY 0.0501 -0.0143 0.1316 0.1429 -0.1798* -0.1389 0.0072 0.068 
15. PROJECT DESIGN 0.1972* 0.1967* 0.1655* 0.0497 -0.0103 -0.0172 0.0191 0.0881 
16. INDEPENDENT -0.1073 -0.031 -0.1781* -0.1692* 0.2332** -0.0689 -0.1600* 0.0083 
17. QUALITY SYSTEM -0.0471 -0.0457 0.3313** 0.0086 0.2148* -0.2857** 0.2043** -0.0237 
Note: ** implies 99% level of significance, * implies 95% level of significance. 
 
 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
9. R&D DEPARTMENT 1        
10. HIGHER EDUCATION 0.1057 1       
11. POST GRAD EDUC. 0.06 0.035 1      
12. CONTROL RIGHTS 0.0119 0.0501 -0.0928 1     
13. OUTPUT CONTROL TO 
CLIENT -0.1482 -0.0103 -0.1751* 0.6518** 1    
14. PARTIAL EXCLUSIVITY 0.0774 0.0362 0.0082 0.8299** 0.1671* 1   
15. PROJECT DESIGN 0.1496 0.017 0.044 -0.0977 -0.1441 -0.0196 1  
16. INDEPENDENT -0.0404 -0.0159 -0.0149 -0.0833 -0.0373 -0.0904 0.0424 1 
17. QUALITY SYSTEM 0.1063 0.0012 -0.0578 0.1122 -0.0006 0.1334 -0.0312 -0.0102
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Table A3 Test for the endogeneity of control rights (N= 145) 
 IMPROVEMENT NEW SERVICE 
 Coeff.  Std.Err Marginal effect Coeff.  Std.Err. 
Marginal 
effect 
Constant 0.508  1.478 0.197 2.744 * 1.411 1.094 
Log(employees) 0.341 ** 0.150 0.132 0.227 * 0.131 0.090 
Business group 1.004 *** 0.302 0.367 0.547 ** 0.276 0.216 
Export intensity -1.257 ** 0.566 -0.488 -1.094 ** 0.553 -0.436 
Profitability -0.016  0.261 -0.006 -0.327  0.253 -0.130 
R&D department 1.041 *** 0.341 0.347 0.141  0.302 0.056 
R&D intensity -0.644  0.425 -0.250 0.832  1.397 0.332 
Higher education 0.010 * 0.005 0.004 0.014 *** 0.005 0.006 
Post grad education 0.024  0.021 0.009 -0.029  0.023 -0.011 
Control rights -0.621 ** 0.317 -0.241 -0.760 ** 0.305 -0.303 
Control rights residuals 0.601 * 0.327 0.233 0.584 * 0.312 0.234 
Advertising 0.711  0.533 0.258 -0.606  0.482 -0.235 
Machine and process engineering 0.497  0.618 0.184 -0.526  0.545 -0.205 
Electrical engineering 0.276  0.614 0.104 -1.328 ** 0.575 -0.447 
Management consulting 0.546  0.649 0.195 -0.909  0.608 -0.327 
R&D services 0.299  0.734 0.112 -0.657  0.710 -0.247 
Log likelihood -74.52    -83.42    
% correct predictions 74.5%    69.0%    
Notes: *** denotes 99% significance, ** denotes 95% significance, * denotes 90% significance levels.  
The reference industry is industrial design. The marginal effect of a binary variable is P(1)-P(0). 
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